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MOTHER JONES MEETS GORDON GEKKO:
THE COMPLICATED RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN LABOR AND PRIVATE EQUITY
MATTHEW T. BODIE ∗

In 2007, private equity firms came under increasing scrutiny
for the favorable tax treatment accorded to their fund managers' compensation. Labor, particularly the Service Workers International Union (“SEIU”), was instrumental in
bringing this issue to the attention of the media and the public. However, SEIU's private equity campaign is just one way
in which the union is pursuing its primary concern: increasing the ranks of its members. This Article examines the role
that the SEIU private equity campaign plays both in the
overall debate about private equity taxation as well as in the
union's negotiations with private equity firms. It argues
that SEIU is using the campaign not only to promote
changes in public policy, but also to pressure private equity
firms to work with the union on issues such as card-check
agreements. Unions, like other businesses, should be free to
pursue their political agendas—agendas that serve their interests as businesses. Efforts to restrict union political activity are based on an outdated vision of union representation
and would cause (if enacted) further distortions to the market for political influence.

INTRODUCTION
Last year marked the twentieth anniversary of the movie
Wall Street. 1 The movie provided a brilliant encapsulation of
the financial markets in the 1980s. 2 Private equity funds, hos∗ Associate Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law. A.B., Princeton University; J.D., Harvard Law School; LL.M., New York University School of Law.
Thanks to the participants at the Second Annual Colloquium on Current Scholarship in Labor and Employment Law for their comments and questions. Thanks as
well to the University of Colorado Law School, the University of Denver Sturm
College of Law, and the Colorado Law Review for hosting the conference. Sarah
Leberstein and Victor Fleischer contributed much-appreciated thoughts and assistance on this project.
1. WALL STREET (Amercent Films 1987).
2. For a discussion of the film’s depiction of business, see Larry Ribstein,
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tile takeovers, insider trading—all are colorfully and sharply
depicted. The most iconic figure is of course Gordon Gekko, the
takeover artist who seduces the protagonist, Bud Black, into
betraying his ideals and his father in the pursuit of great
wealth. 3 Although twenty years have passed, Gekko himself
might be forgiven for being even more at home in this era. Private equity firms have made big splashes throughout all sectors of the economy. These funds have bought out some of this
country’s largest companies, including Clear Channel Communications, 4 Bausch & Lomb, 5 and Chrysler Automotive (now
Chrysler LLC). 6 Several private equity funds raised substantial investment funds through the public markets through lucrative initial public offerings. Fund executives have ensconced themselves at the top of the wealth pyramid. 7 Stephen
Schwarzman, CEO of the Blackstone Group, took his company
public at the same time he threw himself a $4 million birthday
party. 8 Schwarzman, whose wealth and style have invited
comparisons to Gekko, 9 recently fueled the comparison by inImagining Wall Street, 1 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 165 (2006).
3. Gekko’s speech to the Teldar Paper shareholders remains an oft-cited
paean to the virtues of self-interest. See, e.g., id. at 186–87.
4. Associated Press, Clear Channel Shareholders Approve Buyout, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 26, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/26/business/media/26
clear.html?ref=business. At the time of this writing, however, the banks that
were funding the deal were threatening not to go through with it. See Michael J.
de la Merced & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Six Banks are Sued in Clear Channel Deal,
N.Y. TIMES, March 27, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/27/busi
ness/media/27radio-web.html?scp=5&sq=%22Clear%20Channel%20Deal%22&st=
cse.
5. Bausch & Lomb Holders Approve Warburg Pincus Buyout, INT’L
BUS. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2007, available at http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/20070921
/bausch-amp-lomb-warburg-pincus-buyout-approve.htm.
6. Nick Bunkley, With Sale, Chrysler’s Identity is Simplified, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 4, 2007, at C9, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/04/business/04
auto.html.
7. It is now a matter of pop culture wisdom that the richest of the rich
are hedge fund and private equity managers. See, e.g., Duff McDonald, The
Running of the Hedgehogs, N.Y. MAG., Apr. 9, 2007, available at
http://nymag.com/news/features/2007/hedgefunds/30341/ (noting that “[t]hree out
of ten of us think the average hedge-fund pro makes more than $10 million a
year”).
8. Liz Smith, Bash Makes History, N.Y. POST, Feb. 16, 2007, http://www.ny
post.com/seven/02162007/gossip/liz/bash_makes_history_liz_liz_smith.htm
(estimating that the party – feting 600 guests with entertainers Patti LaBelle,
Martin Short, and Rod Stewart – cost between $3 and $4 million).
9. See, e.g., Kurt Andersen, Greed is Good and Ugly, N.Y. MAG., July 23,
2007, available at http://nymag.com/news/imperialcity/34990 (“Steve Schwarzman
is a perfect poster boy for this age of greed, sharklike, perpetually grinning, a tiny
Gordon Gekko without the hair product.”).
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vesting $600 million in a Chinese company called BlueStar—a
company with the same name as the airline in Wall Street that
provides the critical denouement. 10
All this conspicuous wealth generation and dissipation
raises concern and even outrage over private equity’s increasing wealth and power. The media has indulged in breathless
coverage of the parties, the art purchases, the bonuses, the annual compensation, and the occasional meltdown—often with a
blend of disgust and envy. 11 Not unexpectedly, private equity’s
resurgent wealth and power attracted the attention of Congress. The summer of 2007 saw multiple Congressional hearings 12 and proposed legislation. There were bills specifically
targeted at the Blackstone IPO, 13 as well as Representative
Rangel’s “mother of all tax reforms” that would raise taxes on
private equity, hedge funds, and venture capital firms. 14 Media reports indicate a pitched battle between the private equity
industry and a variety of other interest groups. 15

10. Jessica Winter, Greed is Bad. Bad!, SLATE, Sept. 25, 2007,
http://www.slate.com/id/2174672/.
11. See McDonald, supra note 7; Smith, supra note 8; John
Carney, Amaranth Meltdown Roundup, DEALBREAKER,
Sept. 20, 2006,
http://www.dealbreaker.com/2006/09/amaranth_meltdown_roundup.php; see also
Daisy Ku & Kate Holton, Blackstone Defends Private Equity Role in
Business, REUTERS, Nov. 26, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/innovation
News/idUSL266319520071126?pageNumber=1&virtualBrandChannel=10000
(discussing Schwarzman’s view that private equity is “a destructive force with a
short-term perspective, levering companies and stripping their assets to enrich a
few nasty people like me”).
12. See, e.g., Carried Interest, Part I: Hearing before the S. Comm. on Fin.,
110th Cong. (July 11, 2007), available at http://www.senate.gov/~finance/site
pages/hearing071107.htm; Carried Interest, Part II: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on Fin., 110th Cong. (July 31, 2007), available at http://www.senate.gov/~finance/
sitepages/hearing073107.htm; Carried Interest Part III: Pension Issues: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 110th Cong. (Sept. 6, 2007), available at
http://www.senate.gov/~finance/sitepages/hearing090607.htm.
13. S.
1624,
110th
Cong.
(1st
Sess.
2007),
available
at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_bills&docid=
f:s1624is.txt.pdf; H.R. 2834, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_bills&docid=
f:h2834ih.txt.pdf. For an overview of the Blackstone IPO and its tax engineering,
see Victor Fleischer, Taxing Blackstone, TAX L. REV. (forthcoming 2008), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1012472.
14. Lisa Lerer, Professor’s Proposal Angers Wall Street, POLITICO.COM, Oct.
30, 2007, http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=ED41ADCB-3048-5C12-00
6DB3713DD44940.
15. Big Day in Washington for Carried Interest Debate, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK
(Andrew Ross Sorkin ed.), Sept. 6, 2007, http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/
09/06/big-day-in-washington-for-carried-interest-debate.
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It should not be surprising to find labor unions involved in
this fight. The taxation of private equity cuts to the heart of
labor’s political agenda: namely, ensuring fair treatment for
working men and women. Taxing the wealthiest at a rate less
than half that of the average worker is a perfect example of the
political “stacked deck” that unions rail against. Without a
doubt, unions have worked hard, both publicly and behind the
scenes, to reform the existing tax rates for private equity. One
union, the Service Employees International Union (SEIU), has
been out front on this issue. It established an initiative called
“Behind the Buyouts” designed to inform the public about the
role of private equity—an initiative that has included a lengthy
policy paper, street theater, and political action. 16
It may seem obvious that SEIU, along with other unions,
would fight tooth-and-nail against private equity and would
push hard for legislation raising taxes on the fund managers.
And indeed, much of their activity has fallen into this predictable vein. The reality, however, is more complicated. Yes,
SEIU is involved in the current Congressional activity on the
carried-interest issue. And yes, SEIU has promoted concerns
about private equity through its websites, its reports, and even
through political theater. 17 At the same time, however, in 2007
SEIU did not officially take a position on any of the pending
private-equity-oriented legislation. 18 As its materials make
16. Nathan Vardi, Hill to Hear Union Concerns, FORBES.COM, May 14, 2007,
http://www.forbes.com/leadership/2007/05/14/chrysler-buyout-congress-leadmanage-cx_nv_0514unions.html (noting that SEIU “recently started a private equity campaign featuring a Web site, behindthebuyouts.org”).
17. See, e.g., Buyout Tax Debate Hits the Hamptons, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK
(Andrew Ross Sorkin ed.), Aug. 30, 2007, http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/
08/30/buyout-tax-debate-hits-the-hamptons.
18. Since the initial draft of this article in fall 2007, SEIU has grown more
aggressive in its approach to private equity. There are signs that the union has
moved away from its silence on the tax bills and is now supporting those bills.
For example, the union recently placed an ad in Roll Call which states plainly,
“Close the carried tax loophole. Support HR 6725.” (HR 6275 refers to the Alternative Minimum Tax Relief Act of 2008. See H.R. 6275, 110th Cong. (2d Sess.
2008), available at http://www.thomas.gov/ (“Search Bill Text” for Number “H.R.
6275”; select a version of the bill to view). Section 710 of the Act provides that income from investment services partnership interests shall be treated as ordinary
income for tax purposes. Id. However, this movement does not change the paper’s thesis: namely, that the private equity initiative is a combination of ideological commitment and savvy negotiating tactics. As time has passed, the union has
stepped up its pressure on private equity firms. See Thomas Heath, Ambushing
Private Equity, WASH. POST, April 17, 2008, at D1 (“[SEIU’s Stephen] Lerner and
[Andy] Stern began meeting with the heads of the big private-equity firms about a
year ago, asking them to be more generous with health care, salaries and other
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clear, SEIU is not opposed to private equity as long as private
equity is sufficiently worker-friendly. In other words, the union’s ultimate stance on private equity taxation may depend on
the industry’s willingness to work with labor.
Labor’s complicated relationship with private equity
should prompt reconsideration of two standard narratives that
inform our traditional approach to labor law. First, SEIU’s
campaign illustrates that a binary, labor-against-capital system of labor law ignores a much more complicated twenty-first
century reality. Although unions and employers may have
competing interests, they also have complimentary interests
that savvy unions are exploring. Instead of seeing unions simply as public service organizations that protect worker rights,
unions should be recognized as members of a service industry
that pursue better terms for their members and growth for
their organizations. Rather than being surprised when unions
act like sophisticated businesses, we should welcome this new
development.
Second, there is the longstanding narrative about the distinction between union spending on politics and spending on
collective bargaining. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held
that unions must differentiate their spending between collective
bargaining
representation
expenses
and
nonrepresentation expenses such as spending on political causes. 19
All represented employees must pay representation expenses,
but they may opt out of paying for non-representation activities. 20 The SEIU’s political campaign on the private-equity
taxation issue provides yet another example of the illogic of
this distinction. Like any other industry, unions must use
their resources to protect their interests in the halls of government. The notion of a separation between politics and collecemployee benefits. . . . When the union didn’t get the response it wanted, it turned
up the heat.”).
19. See Commc’n Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988); Ellis v. Bhd. of
Ry. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435 (1984); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740
(1961).
20. Employees who are represented by a union have the choice whether or not
to become members of that union. However, unions may still charge nonmembers for the cost of representation expenses. See NLRB v. General Motors
Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 744–45 (1963) (permitting “agency shop” agreements
whereby unions charge non-members for the costs of collective representation).
However, states are permitted under § 14(b) of the NLRA to outlaw agency shop
agreements. 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (2000). Twenty-two states currently have “right
to work” provisions outlawing such agreements. MICHAEL C. HARPER ET AL.,
LABOR LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 982–83 (5th ed. 2003).
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tive bargaining rests on a flawed vision of the union’s role in
both arenas.
This Article describes a new vision for the relationship between labor unions and capitalists. Part I provides background
on the resurgence of private equity and discusses the traditional labor response to this growth. Part II discusses SEIU’s
innovative approaches to workplace representation, from the
“Change to Win” coalition to the focus on card-check representation agreements. In Part III, this Article focuses on the complicated interactions between labor (particularly SEIU) and
private equity funds. Finally, Part IV addresses how SEIU’s
private equity campaign should influence our conceptions of
unions as political actors.
I.

THE GROWTH OF PRIVATE EQUITY AND LABOR’S
TRADITIONAL RESPONSE

Private equity firms serve a unique role within the world
of high finance. They specialize in targeted takeovers of whole
companies with a limited period of ownership. Private equity
firms generally manage separate funds—pools of money in
which sophisticated investors place significant chunks of
money for an extended period of time (usually ten years). 21
The firm manages the fund with an eye towards making large
returns before the end of the fund’s life span. The modus operandi of most private equity firms is to use their funds to take
control of companies and then resell the company by the end of
the fund’s term. These big-ticket investments are the primary
difference between private equity and other funds, such as
hedge funds or mutual funds. While most other funds have a
wide range of different investments on any particular day, private equity managers place a few large investments over the
course of the ten-year fund. 22
Private equity firms thus have a unique blend of long-term
and short-term incentives when managing their funds. On the
one hand, private equity firms must take great care in making
their investments; they do not leap in and out of positions on
21. Brian Cheffins & John Armour, The Eclipse of Private Equity
(ECGI – Law Working Paper No. 082/2007, 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=982114.
22. Steven E. Hurdle, Jr., Comment, A Blow to Public Investing: Reforming
the System of Private Equity Fund Disclosures, 53 UCLA L. REV. 239, 242 (2005)
(noting that most investments have a time horizon of seven to thirteen years).
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the value of the Thai baht, for example. 23 Because of this care,
private equity firms have been characterized as shareholders
with uniquely low agency costs: they have the combination of
financial stake, attentiveness, and control that can allow them
to oversee management effectively. 24 However, private equity
firms also have some significant pressures to make a fast
profit. First, the fund’s life span is ticking from its beginning;
the funds must all be returned (with profits) at the end of the
span. Second, and more significantly, most private equity
deals rely on debt in order to finance the control transaction.
Private equity firms generally borrow in the range of fifty to
seventy–five percent to finance the transaction, 25 and the debt
service begins immediately. Thus, private equity firms must
often find quick savings in order to make interest payments.
Because private equity firms are (1) solely focused on their
returns as shareholders, and (2) interested in finding fast ways
of saving money, their interests often conflict with the interests
of workers at the newly-acquired company. In seeking to cut
costs, the first place to look is often the workforce. In the
1980s, private equity funds frequently made their money by
simply taking over a company, putting in new management,
terminating a percentage of the workforce, selling off or closing
underperforming divisions, and then reselling the remaining
company for a profit. 26 Sometimes management became involved in such takeovers through a leveraged buyout. But in
other cases, the private equity firm pursued a hostile takeover
such as the Teldar Paper tender offer in Wall Street. 27
In contrast, the 1980s were a difficult time for unions and
their members. Many of the manufacturing jobs that were the
unions’ bread and butter were leaving the country for cheaper
overseas labor. Companies that had implicitly given their
workers a lifetime employment contract began reneging on
23. See Phillip L. Zweig, The Hedge Funds: The Rich Get a Little Richer,
BUSINESSWEEK, Aug. 25, 1997, http://www.businessweek.com/1997/34/b35411
91.htm (discussing various hedge fund positions in the Thai currency).
24. For a discussion of the agency cost advantages to private equity, see Michael Jensen, The Eclipse of the Public Corporation, 67 HARV. BUS. REV. 61
(1989).
25. See Robert Bartlett, Taking Finance Seriously: How Debt Financing Distorts Bidding Outcomes in Corporate Takeovers, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1975, 2004
(2008) (discussing studies that show an average of sixty percent debt-to-equity ratios for 2006 buyouts, and an almost ninety percent ratio for completed buyouts
between 1980 and 1989).
26. See generally Jensen, supra note 24.
27. See Ribstein, supra note 2.
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those contracts and firing workers with significant seniority.
President Reagan’s firing of illegally-striking air-traffic controllers legitimized efforts to replace striking employees as well as
tougher labor negotiations. 28 At the same time, hostile takeovers fueled by private equity and their ilk became the apotheosis of the cold-blooded capitalism that had seemingly taken
over the country.
The response of unions to private equity was predictable
and economically justified. Unions lobbied to give management
greater protection against hostile takeovers—reasoning, perhaps, that the devil you know is better than the one you
don’t. 29 The most significant tangible results of this lobbying
were the many “corporate constituency” statutes that sprang
up in late 1980s and early 1990s. 30 These constituency statutes provided that a company’s board of directors could take all
of the stakeholders of a corporation into account when considering a transformative transaction. 31 Thus, rather than simply
looking at the deal from the perspective of the shareholders,
the board could look to the interests of employees, bondholders,
customers, and even the local community in making its strategic decisions. The purpose of these statutes was to provide a
statutory excuse for boards’ efforts to block takeover attempts
that may have been beneficial to shareholders but harmful to
management and employees. Private equity deals were the
quintessential target for this legislation. However, constituency statutes had no real independent power in preventing

28. Michael H. LeRoy & John H. Johnson IV, Death by Lethal Injection: National Emergency Strikes under the Taft-Hartley Act and the Moribund Right to
Strike, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 63, 66 (2001) (“President Reagan’s firing of nearly 12,000
air traffic controllers in response to a 1981 strike is also identified as a pivotal
event in the decline of strikes. Some observers argue that this strike-response encouraged private employers to break, rather than settle, strikes.”)
29. See Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Should Labor Be Allowed to
Make Shareholder Proposals?, 73 WASH. L. REV. 41, 47 (1998) (“During [the
1980s], unions generally supported corporate management in resisting hostile acquisitions by, among other things, pushing for stronger state antitakeover laws
and accepting defensive employee stock ownership plans. Employee shareholders
also supported a host of other antitakeover devices that insulated management
from the consequences of poor performance.”).
30. Thirty-one states currently have such statutes on their books. See
Roberta Romano, The States as a Laboratory: Legal Innovation and State Competition for Corporate Charters, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 209, 215 tbl.1 (2006).
31. For an example of a corporate constituency statute, see N.Y. BUS. CORP.
LAW § 717(b) (McKinney 2006).
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hostile takeovers and other worker-unfriendly transactions; at
best, they simply gave directors more discretion. 32
As the recession hit in the late 1980s and the stock market
cooled off, private equity receded somewhat from public view.
At the same time, unions and their affiliated pension funds
took a more active role as players in the markets and in corporate governance. 33 In some situations, labor was just bringing
traditional battles to a new forum. 34 However, in other cases,
unions began to form new alliances with other institutional investors in a renewed effort to police management. These efforts often cut against the labor-management alliances that
had been formed in the 1980s. For example, union pension
funds proposed shareholder resolutions asking that companies
eliminate certain antitakeover defenses, such as the poison
pill. 35 These resolutions sought to dismantle the protections
that unions helped to erect in an earlier decade. They demonstrated the possibility of a new union and pension-fund mindset that was more comfortable with other shareholders than it
was with management.

32. Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579, 580 n.4 (1992) (citing a
letter from Joseph Grundfest, Commissioner, Securities Exchange Commission, to
Mario Cuomo, Governor for New York (June 6, 1989)). See id. at 581 (“The principal criticism of rejecting this traditional relationship is that authorizing the
board to consider constituencies that have no monitoring or enforcement powers
would leave the board accountable to nobody.”); Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder
Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2063,
2065 (2001) (“[A] stakeholder measure of managerial accountability could leave
managers so much discretion that managers could easily pursue their own
agenda, one that might maximize neither shareholder, employee, consumer, nor
national wealth, but only their own.”).
33. Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance: Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1018, 1019 (1998)
(“In the 1990s, however, unions have become the most aggressive of all institutional shareholders.”).
34. See id. at 1025–27 (discussing “new union tactics in pursuit of old union
goals,” such as one union’s corporate campaign against Albertson’s grocery stores).
35. Id. at 1027–29 (discussing one such proposal). “Poison pill” is the terminology used for certain defensive strategies that target companies employ to defeat a hostile takeover. The most common example of a poison pill involves the
distribution of a new class of stock to the common shareholders. This stock contains certain provisions that will dilute the equity holdings of a hostile bidder
should the bidder endeavor to go forward without the target board’s approval.
The target board distributes this stock to shareholders in order to prevent a hostile bid from going forward. However, the board also retains the option to cancel
these provisions, in order to allow the board to approve a bid at its discretion.
See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, The Legality and Utility of the Shareholder Rights
Bylaw, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 835, 839 (1998).
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This mindset carried over into the new century—in fact, it
is probably now even stronger. Scandals such as Enron and
WorldCom provided further fuel to an already growing fire of
resentment and concern from the putative “owners” of the corporation, the stockholders. 36 A new wave of shareholder activism has pushed for greater control and power for shareholders
in their relationship with the incumbent management. Shareholder activists have been sharply critical of excessive executive compensation; 37 have fought against conflicts of interest
between the board and the executives they oversee; 38 and have
sought greater power over the corporation’s leaders and governance structure. 39 These concerns were met with concrete
changes in policy, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley independent director requirements, 40 the SEC’s new required disclosure for
executive pay, 41 and the Second Circuit’s recent ruling that
shareholders could use existing resolution procedures to nominate directors. 42
36. It is a misnomer to call shareholders the owners. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601,
604 (2006) (calling this view “deeply erroneous”); Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-SoBad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1192 (2002)
(“From both a legal and an economic perspective, the claim that shareholders own
the public corporation simply is empirically incorrect.”). However, shareholders
are entitled to the residual profits of the corporation, and thus they have particular incentives to make sure management maximizes this residual.
37. See, e.g., LUCIAN A. BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT
PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004)
(arguing that the high levels of executive compensation are explained better by
power relationships, rather than executive performance).
38. In one well-known example, Disney shareholders pursued a derivative
suit blaming the board for failing to oversee the compensation package of one-time
president Michael Ovitz. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693
(Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
39. See Am. Fed’n of State, County & Mun. Employees v. Am. Int’l Group, Inc.
462 F.3d 121, 129–30 (2d Cir. 2006) (permitting shareholders to propose easier
shareholder access for board nominations); Lucien A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 862–65 (2005) (arguing that
shareholders should be able to initiate changes to the corporation’s charter or
place of incorporation). For an overview of Bebchuk’s role in pushing for shareholders’ rights, see Dan Slater, The Activist Professor, THE DEAL, June 4-10, 2007,
at 40.
40. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(3) (Supp. IV
2004) (requiring independence for all audit committee members).
41. Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, Securities Act
Release No. 8732A, Exchange Act Release No. 54302A, Investment Company Act
Release No. 27444A, 71 Fed. Reg. 53,158 (Sept. 8, 2006), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2006/33-8732afr.pdf.
42. Am. Fed’n of State, County & Mun. Employees, 462 F.3d at 123. The case
involved a shareholder proposal under Securities Exchange Act Rule 14a-8 that
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Labor has been deeply involved in this new movement.
Unions and their affiliated pension funds are some of the largest institutional shareholders. 43 The unions have continued
their efforts to work with other shareholders to oversee management and increase shareholder returns. In the shareholdernomination proposal case, it was a union, after all, that submitted the shareholder proposal and brought the subsequent
litigation. 44 Critics of the new “shareholder democracy” movement often single out unions as the type of shareholders that
will unduly benefit from pro-democracy reforms. 45
As unions become more likely to ally with shareholders,
one might expect a warmer relationship between labor and private equity. Indeed, there are undoubtedly greater financial
ties. Although the precise holdings of private equity firms are
kept secret, pension funds are among their investors. 46 However, there has been less evidence of the type of mutual alli-

would have amended the company’s bylaws to allow shareholders to nominate directors for election on the company’s proxy ballot. The court held that under thenexisting regulations, the SEC could not permit companies to exclude such proposals on the grounds that they are related to an election. However, the SEC has
since clarified its rules to permit the exclusion of such proposals. See SEC Release
No.
34-56914,
Dec.
6,
2007,
available
at:
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2007/34-56914.pdf.
43. State and local pension funds alone control approximately ten percent of
the U.S. equity market. David Hess, Public Pension Funds and the Promise of
Shareholder Activism for the Next Frontier of Corporate Governance: Sustainable
Economic Development, 2 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 221, 225 (2007).
44. Am. Fed’n of State, County & Mun. Employees, 462 F.3d at 123–24.
45. See, e.g., Stephen Bainbridge, Commentary, Unions Abusing Pension
Funds for Politics, EXAMINER.COM, Sept. 6, 2007, http://www.examiner.com/a919085~Stephen_Bainbridge__Unions_abusing_pension_funds_for_politics.html
(arguing that the SEC should “consider carefully” the investors it empowers, since
union pension funds have interests that are counter to other shareholders); John
Carney, Against Shareholder Democracy, DEALBREAKER, Sept. 27, 2007,
http://www.dealbreaker.com/2007/09/against_shareholder_democracy.php (noting
the “even grimmer scenario” of unions using shareholder initiatives to procure
better pay for their members); Larry E. Ribstein, The “Shareholder Democracy”
Scam, IDEOBLOG, http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/2006/10/the_shareholder
.html (Oct. 27, 2006, 07:35) (“Corporate elections are unions’ last opportunity to
shore up their declining clout.”).
46. Pension Funds Moving Asset Allocation to Alternative Investments, Study
Finds, DAILY LABOR REPORT, March 15, 2005 (citing report that pensions had invested three to four percent of their funds in private equity, but that they also
planned to invest more in the upcoming year); Robert Reich, Commentary, Corporate, Public Pensions Roll the Dice (MARKETPLACE podcast July 18, 2007),
http://marketplace.publicradio.org/display/web/2007/07/18/corporate_public_pensi
ons_roll_the_dice (noting that state pension plans have as much as twenty percent of their investments in private equity and hedge funds, and that some corporate plans have as much as forty percent in such funds).
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ances that labor has formed with other investor groups. Private equity seems less concerned with the greater transparency, lower executive compensation, and democracy-facilitating
reforms of the shareholder democracy movement. Indeed, private equity continues to work in the rip-tide of the movement.
Some have argued that reportedly pro-shareholder reforms
such as Sarbanes-Oxley have increased the costs of being a
public company and thus have heightened the incentives to go
private. 47 Private equity firms are happy to participate in the
process; in addition, they have reportedly been willing to reward their management handsomely, in ways that are less acceptable in the public realm. 48
And there are still the traditional conflicts that arise when
private equity looks to take over a unionized company. The recent buyout of Chrysler Automotive by Cerberus Capital Management is instructive. Chrysler merged with the German
company Daimler Benz in 1998 and subsequently become a division of the larger company. Although the merger received
significant criticism for its treatment of Chrysler shareholders, 49 Chrysler’s unionized workers had less to fear from the
German takeover, given Germany’s employee-oriented “codetermination” policies. 50 For example, the president of the International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW) sat on the
DaimlerChrysler supervisory board pursuant to these policies. 51

47. See Ehud Kamar, Pinar Karaca-Mandic & Eric L. Talley, Going-Private
Decisions and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: A Cross-Country Analysis, 25 J. L.
ECON. & ORG. (forthcoming 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=901769;
Ellen Engel, Rachel M. Hayes, & Xue Wang, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Firms’
Going-Private Decisions (May 6, 2004) (working paper), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=546626.
48. Cheffins & Armour, supra note 21.
49. Chrysler’s largest shareholder prior to the merger sued DaimlerChrysler
afterwards claiming that the assertions concerning a “merger of equals” were
fraudulent misrepresentations. Tracinda Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler AG, 502 F.3d
212, 216 (3d Cir. 2007). However, the suit was not successful. See id. at 232–33
(finding no misrepresentations).
50. See BILL VLASIC & BRADLEY A. STERTZ, TAKEN FOR A RIDE: HOW
DAIMLER-BENZ DROVE OFF WITH CHRYSLER 249 (2000) (noting that “[e]ven labor’s
champions could hardly find fault with [the merger]”).
51. Mark Landler & Micheline Maynard, Chrysler Group to be Sold for $7.4
Billion, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/
15/automobiles/15chrysler-web.html?_r=1&scp=2&sq=Landler%20&%20Maynard
&st=cse&oref=slogin.

2008]

LABOR AND PRIVATE EQUITY

1331

In 2007, DaimlerChrysler indicated an interest in selling
off the Chrysler division. The announcement came after a series of poor financial results, including the downgrading of its
bonds and a 2006 operating loss of $1.5 billion. 52 The company
laid off over 13,000 workers and closed one plant. 53 Despite
the company’s poor showing, union leaders were adamant
against the sale of the company to a private equity firm. In
April, UAW president Ron Gettelfinger characterized private
equity bidders as “strip and flip artists” who were out to make
a quick buck off the company. 54 He likened them to vultures
“hovering overhead right now.” 55 The media tended to echo
Gettelfinger’s fears. 56
A month later, however, Chrysler was sold to the private
equity firm Cerberus Capital Management. Cerberus is an unusually secretive firm, even for private equity. 57 It has a reputation for bringing its own group of executive talent into play
as part of its takeover strategy. 58 Cerberus had been involved
in large deals before, but nothing as large or as prominent as
Chrysler. Perhaps in light of Cerberus’s reputation, current
chairman John Snow was careful to indicate a willingness to
work with labor as part of the deal. 59 More surprising was the
UAW’s eventual blessing. After the announcement of the
52. Eric Weiner, Q&A: Under the Hood of the Chrysler Deal, NPR, May 14,
2007, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=10184023.
53. Id.
54. Dale Russakoff & David Cho, New Labor Strikes Deals With “Private Equity Guys,” WASH. POST, June 10, 2007, at A1.
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., Frank Langfitt, United Auto Workers Support Chrysler Sale
(NPR broadcast May 15, 2007), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyId=10184023 (“While private equity is generally looking to cut
costs by cutting jobs and benefits, unions are busy trying to protect them.”).
57. Andrew Ross Sorkin, A Savior For Chrysler? Read On, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
19, 2008, at C1 (quoting Cerberus founder Stephen Feinberg as saying “[w]e despise
all
the
public
attention
we
are
getting”),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/19/business/19sorkin.html?scp=1&sq=%22A%20
Savior%20for%20Chrysler%22&st=cse; Emily Thornton, What’s Bigger Than
Cisco,
Coke,
or
McDonald’s?,
BUSINESSWEEK,
Oct.
3,
2005,
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_40/b3953110.htm (discussing
how Cerberus’s founder has a more “well-developed” penchant for secrecy than
most private equity fund managers).
58. Id.
59. Nick Bunkley, Workers Surprised as Union Backs Sale to Private
HERALD
TRIB.,
May
14,
2007,
Equity
Firm,
INT’L
http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/05/14/business/14unions.php
(quoting
John
Snow: “Cerberus has a good record of working successfully with companies that
are organized. . . .We respect the role of organized labor. We appreciate the support the UAW has given.”).
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merger, Gettelfinger said it was “in the best interest of [the]
membership.” 60 He further conceded that “once that decision’s
been made, then you’ve got to deal with the cards that you’re
dealt,” 61 and the “vulture” rhetoric disappeared. Many workers
remained suspicious of the merger, particularly because of the
union’s earlier fears. 62 As one worker expressed: “Are they
buying us to help us out or to suck the blood? It’s kind of
scary.” 63 The announcement that no layoffs were currently
planned did little to quell fears. As one automotive analyst
noted, the UAW thought private equity “would be the end of
the world, and in some ways it probably would be.” 64
Although it is too early to tell how the deal will ultimately
shake out for its participants, it has thus far shown signs of the
traditional private-equity-meets-unionized-industry narrative.
Cerberus hired Robert Nardelli to be Chrysler’s CEO; Nardelli
had been forced out at Home Depot after having notoriously
bad relationships with institutional investors. 65 The big concern prior to the merger was the negotiation of a new labor deal
after the prior deal’s expiration in September. 66 After striking
GM for two days to get a new collective bargaining agreement,
the UAW needed to strike Chrysler for only six hours to get a
similar deal. 67 However, despite the deal’s blessing by UAW
leadership, Chrysler workers only narrowly approved the new
agreement. 68 Soon after the approval, the new owners insti60. Id.
61. Chrysler Workers Worried, OAK. TRIB., May 15, 2007, at 1, available at
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4176/is_20070515/ai_n19111684.
62. Bunkley, supra note 59 (“Chrysler workers were warned a few weeks ago
by union officials that a private equity owner would be the worst thing that could
happen to them. So many were as surprised as anyone on Monday to learn that
the sale of Chrysler to Cerberus Capital Management had their leaders’ support.”).
63. Chrysler Workers Worried, supra note 61.
64. Landler & Maynard, supra note 51.
65. Alex Taylor III, Nardelli is Strike One for Chrysler, FORTUNE,
Aug. 6, 2007, available at http://money.cnn.com/2007/08/06/news/companies/
chrysler_nardelli.fortune/index.htm?section=money_topstories
(noting
that
Nardelli “arrives on the heels of an enormous fiasco at Home Depot”).
66. Indeed, prior to the sale it was thought that these labor talks would doom
any potential for a deal. Union Negotiations May Hold Up Chrysler Sale,
N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Andrew Ross Sorkin ed.), April 24, 2007,
http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/04/24/union-negotiations-may-hold-upchrysler-sale.
67. Micheline Maynard, A 6-Hour Strike by Auto Workers Against Chrysler,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2007, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/11/
business/11auto.html.
68. Micheline Maynard, Workers at Chrysler Narrowly Approve 4-Year
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tuted massive layoffs—layoffs that were double what many had
expected. 69 Commentary on the layoffs included the notion
that “[p]rivate equity is much better equipped to take the Draconian cuts” than public companies and that the layoffs constituted “stripping,” a reference to Gettelfinger’s “strip and flip”
comment. 70 Chrysler also announced a two-week shutdown in
July—a vacation shutdown in which employees would have to
use their vacation time. 71 In February, Cerberus came under
fire for a letter it sent to its investors. The letter noted that the
firm did “not need to be heroes” to do well on its Chrysler investment, perhaps indicating that the firm would staunch its
losses rather than trying to save the firm. 72 Most recently, the
company has had to fend off rumors of impending bankruptcy. 73
The uncertain and suspicious relationship between Cerberus and the UAW is characteristic of the usual relations between labor and private equity. Private equity takes over a
compromised but still surviving industry; labor protests but is
ultimately powerless to do anything; massive layoffs ensue.
However, there are indications that in other arenas, these often
antagonistic players may find themselves in increasingly complicated relationships.
II. SEIU’S NEW APPROACH
SEIU is the largest and fastest-growing union in the country. 74 The union currently has almost two million members,
Contract, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2007, at A18, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2007/10/28/business/28auto.html (noting concerns that “the contract did not provide as many guarantees of future work as a similar contract approved by workers
at General Motors earlier this month, after a two-day strike”).
69. Micheline Maynard, Job Cuts at Chrysler Go Even Deeper
Than Expected, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2007, at C1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/02/business/02auto.html?scp=1&sq=%22Job%20
cuts%20at%20Chrysler%22&st=cse.
70. Id. at C8.
71. Posting of Gordon Smith to The Conglomerate Blog, Chrysler’s Closure,
http://www.theconglomerate.org/2008/03/chryslers-closu.html (March 13, 2008).
In his email to employees, Nardelli said that “[a]s a private company, we all need
to think like owners and do our part to accelerate Chrysler’s recovery and transformation.” Id.
72. Sorkin, supra note 57.
73. David N. Goodman, Chrysler Denies Bankruptcy Talk, Welcomes
PRESS,
June
26,
2008,
available
at
Iacocca,
ASSOCIATED
http://biz.yahoo.com/ap/080626/chrysler.html.
74. Matt Bai, The New Boss, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2005, (Magazine), at 38.
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having grown from 600,000 members twenty years ago. 75 Its
remarkable growth is even more impressive given the workers
that the union seeks to serve. SEIU focuses on health-care and
other service workers, particularly property services such as
janitorial and maintenance workers. 76 Many of these workers
receive low wages and have few skills that the market values
highly. SEIU has taken these workers and formed a powerful
presence in economic and corporate life.
Much of the credit for SEIU’s recent success has been attributed to its colorful and charismatic leader, Andy Stern.
Stern started his career as an organizer for an SEIU local in
the 1970s and a decade later rose to be the national organizing
and field services director. 77 Working with then-SEIU president John Sweeney, Stern helped develop a plan for growth
that almost doubled the union’s size in eight years. 78 Sweeney
rode the union’s success to the presidency of the AFL-CIO in
1994. 79 After Sweeney chose another union officer as his interim replacement at SEIU, two years later Stern ran against
the replacement and won the presidency. 80
Stern’s words and actions since taking office have made
him perhaps the most prominent union leader since Jimmy
Hoffa. Most controversially, Stern is regarded as the catalyst
behind the coalition of unions who broke from the AFL-CIO. In
2005, seven of the largest and most prominent unions left the
AFL-CIO to form the Change to Win Coalition. 81 The move followed an effort by the Coalition unions to change certain AFLCIO practices. The Coalition had proposed greater union consolidation (in order to promote industry concentration), greater
coordination between unions in bargaining and organizing, and
a fifty percent rebate of AFL-CIO dues to those unions who implemented a strategic plan for organizing and growth. 82 How75. See ANDY STERN, A COUNTRY THAT WORKS: GETTING AMERICA BACK ON
TRACK 55–56 (2006); Service Employees International Union (SEIU), What Is
SEIU?, http://www.seiu.org/faqs/faq_whatisseiu.cfm (last visited May 24, 2008).
76. Id.
77. Bai, supra note 74, at 41; STERN, supra note 75, at 44–51.
78. STERN, supra note 75, at 56.
79. Id. at 61.
80. Id. at 61–63.
81. The seven unions are SEIU, the Teamsters, the United Farm Workers,
United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, the Laborers, the
Carpenters, and UNITE HERE (the needletrades, hotel, and restaurant workers).
Change to Win: The American Dream for American Workers, About Us,
http://www.changetowin.org/about-us.html (last visited July 31, 2008).
82. STERN, supra note 75, at 88; David Moberg, Chips Fall in Vegas, NATION,
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ever, the AFL-CIO executive committee rejected the fifty percent rebate in favor of a smaller one, and the Coalition members left the AFL-CIO three months later. 83
The Coalition members’ decision to leave the established
conglomeration of mainline unions caused surprise and consternation among outside observers and union supporters. 84
The move was initially characterized as a dispute over the level
of political spending, with the AFL-CIO allegedly wanting more
and the Coalition members wanting less. 85 Stern has characterized this as a misrepresentation. 86 In fact, the move is better characterized as a step towards Stern’s broader vision for a
renewed labor movement. It is a vision that, in many ways,
sees the union movement not as a political endeavor but rather
as a humanitarian business enterprise.
Stern certainly recognizes the difficulties that unions face
from increasing globalization and employer hostility. 87 However, Stern is more willing than most union leaders to place
some of the blame at the feet of unions themselves. 88 As his
position was once characterized: “if any other $6.5 billion corporation had insisted on clinging to the same decades-old business plan despite losing customers every year, its executives
would have been fired long ago.” 89 Stern believes that union
leaders have been too content with the status quo and have not
done enough to staunch the continued declining rates of unionization.
How does SEIU attack declining rates of unionization?
Part of the answer is simply increased funding: SEIU has funneled resources into organizing ever since Stern became national organizing director in the 1980s. 90 Stern believes all unions should adopt a similar focus. 91 A critical component of the
Coalition’s agenda for change was the “50 percent rebate” for
March 3, 2005, http://www.thenation.com/doc/20050321/moberg.
83. STERN, supra note 75, at 92–98.
84. See, e.g., Howard Fineman, A Democratic House Divided, NEWSWEEK,
June 27, 2005, at 34.
85. Id. at 34 (noting that Coalition members would be “more focused on organizing drives than on electoral politics”).
86. STERN, supra note 75, at 93.
87. Id. at 32–36 (discussing globalization); id. at 49–50 (discussing employer
hostility); id. at 71 (discussing Wal-Mart Watch).
88. Bai, supra note 74, at 40 (noting that Stern was “pointing the finger back
at his fellow union leaders”).
89. Id.
90. STERN, supra note 75, at 55–56, 63–64.
91. Bai, supra note 74, at 43.
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organizing proposal, which would funnel money back to
growth-oriented unions. 92 However, the answer has not simply
been money. SEIU has used its resources in a multi-pronged
approach designed to maximize leverage over the widest possible spectrum. Although any categorization risks oversimplification, it is possible to specify five components of SEIU’s approach: (1) industry concentration, (2) organizing an entire
area, (3) neutrality and card-check agreements, (4) multifaceted political and economic pressure, and (5) “added value”
to the employer.
First, SEIU has focused on organizing only those types of
employees within its ambit of expertise. When he became
president of SEIU, Stern worked to move members who worked
in areas outside of the health or building-service industries into
relationships with other unions. 93 Although this reallocation
hurt SEIU’s rolls in the short-term, Stern believes it was important to reorient the union towards its core members. He
contends that as a result, other unaffiliated unions in the janitorial and health-care industries decided to affiliate with
SEIU. 94 This concentration on certain sets of employees is
critical to Stern’s overall plan for union success. Concentration
not only provides the union with a better knowledge base, but
it also allows the union to flex its muscles more powerfully,
since it does not have to compete against other organizations.
Indeed, Stern believes his calls for significant consolidations
within the AFL-CIO were critical to that organization’s success. 95 One union has more market leverage within an industry than three unions representing the same set of employees.
The importance of concentration is related to a second factor in SEIU’s organizing success: focus on whole regions rather
than individual employers. The traditional union drive seeks
to organize employees at a particular employer and then move
on to other employers. However, such an approach is problematic in the service industries, where companies compete to keep
their labor costs low. 96 If SEIU successfully organized one employer, that employer’s costs could potentially cripple the company’s business. Thus, SEIU has focused on organizing all of
92. STERN, supra note 75, at 88.
93. Id. at 65–66.
94. Id. at 66.
95. Bai, supra note 74, at 43.
96. In the health care and building services industries, labor costs represent a
significant portion of overall expenses.
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the employees in a particular region. In campaigns to organize
janitors in Los Angeles, Houston, and New Jersey, SEIU has
implemented a strategy of seeking to get all of the major companies on board, rather than pursuing them seriatim.
In New Jersey, for example, SEIU struck a deal with companies who provided janitorial services: for those companies
whose employees joined SEIU, the union would not seek to install a contract with new wage increases unless more than half
of the companies in the area signed up as well. 97 In Los Angeles, SEIU mounted campaigns city-wide to organize workers as
part of the “Justice for Janitors” campaign. 98 The concentration of workers into a relatively small number of firms made
such a campaign easier. 99 And in Houston, SEIU pressed the
city’s five major building maintenance companies to sign an
agreement making it easier for the union to recruit workers at
all five companies at the same time. 100 The union successfully
organized four of the companies and reached a common collective bargaining agreement with them a year later. 101
Third, SEIU has worked hard to implement neutrality and
card-check agreements with companies at the start of the organizing process. Although such agreements can vary in their
provisions, 102 they essentially ask the employer to agree to two
things: (1) remain neutral as to the union’s organizing campaign (“neutrality”), and (2) recognize the union if a majority of
employees sign cards asking to be represented by the union
(“card-check”). 103 These agreements are a mainstay of the
SEIU campaign strategy, as they allow for a simpler and more
expeditious organizing process. 104 In fact, in some instances
97. Bai, supra note 74, at 42.
98. Christopher L. Erickson et al., Justice for Janitors in Los Angeles and Beyond, in THE CHANGING ROLE OF UNIONS: NEW FORMS OF REPRESENTATION 22,
28–29 (Phanindra V. Wunnava ed., 2004).
99. Id.
100. Benjamin I. Sachs, Labor Law Renewal, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 375, 379
(2007).
101. See Steven Greenhouse, Cleaning Companies in Accord with Striking
Houston Janitors, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2006, at A18.
102. See Sachs, supra note 100, at 378.
103. For a general discussion of these agreements, see James Brudney, Neutrality Agreements and Card Check Recognition: Prospects for Changing Paradigms, 90 IOWA L. REV. 819, 829–30 (2005).
104. The card-check certification process would have become law under the
proposed Employee Free Choice Act. This past summer, the bill was passed by
the House but failed to reach cloture in the Senate. See Roll Call Vote on H.R.
800, available at http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote
_cfm.cfm?congress=110&session=1&vote=00227. No Democratic Senator voted
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SEIU must stage a ferocious campaign not for the first contract, but rather to get the employer to agree to a neutrality
and card-check agreement. 105
As part of their regional strategy, SEIU organizing drives
usually share a fourth factor: bringing political and economic
pressure on the employers from as many points as possible.
The notion of applying outside pressure is not a new one, but
SEIU’s multi-faceted and creative approaches have taken these
tactics in a new direction. One facet is the use of public pressure. By seeking to organize an entire region at a time, SEIU
can seek to bring the issue to the public’s attention. Rallies,
marches, and even hunger strikes have been employed to bring
attention to the low wages of janitorial employees. 106 The visible nature of these actions gives negative publicity to companies who usually seek to avoid the spotlight.
However, the pressure does not stop there. Since building
maintenance contractors are generally supplying their services
to residential or commercial building owners or management
companies, SEIU has sought to apply pressure to these firms
as well. In the Los Angeles Justice for Janitors campaign in
2000, SEIU’s strike was accompanied by creative political and
community action, and it pressured the building owners into
working out a solution. 107 And in Miami, the union sought the
support of local and national politicians, professors, and students in its dealings with the University of Miami. Even
though the janitors were employed by an outside contractor,
the university controlled the dynamics of the negotiations between the union and the contractor. When the employees ultimately organized the contractor, the university chose not to replace the contractor, and it adopted wage and benefit
requirements that helped cement the employees’ newfound
level of remuneration. 108
Finally, a fifth factor in the SEIU organizing campaigns
has been seeking to bring some additional value to the table for
against cloture.
105. Kenneth M. Casebeer, Of Service Workers, Contracting Out, Joint Employment, Legal Consciousness, and the University of Miami (Univ. Miami
Legal Stud. Working Paper No. 2007–06, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1020623 (discussing SEIU strike at the University of Miami).
106. See, e.g., Erickson et al., supra note 98; Casebeer, supra note 105.
107. Erickson et al., supra note 98, at 49 (noting that one of the area real estate magnates “threatened to make his own arrangement with the union if the
contractors did not agree to settle the dispute”).
108. Casebeer, supra note 105.
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the employers. Along with the pressures from the multifaceted organizing drives, SEIU seeks to make itself a partner
with the companies they are organizing, rather than solely an
adversary. Stern has been upfront about his willingness to
work with employers to bring “added value” to the equation. 109
Some have criticized SEIU for being too willing to work with
employers at the expense of employee interests. 110 But SEIU
sees its methods as creative ways to help both manager and
worker achieve economic success.
One way to bring additional value to the table is through
politics. SEIU has used its political clout to bring additional
revenues into the health care industry, helping both employers
and employees. A common SEIU tactic has been to work with
employer groups to procure more government health care funding. For example, Stern described the SEIU New York Local
1199 and its relationship with local hospital groups in the following way:
The hospital industry’s own efforts to increase its reimbursement rates were viewed as self-serving, just another
interest group trying to feed at the trough of taxpayer dollars. But when SEIU 1199’s nurse aides, social workers,
and nurses lobbied for increased state funding for the hospital, their more sympathetic faces reframed the discussion.
While the hospitals were minimally politically active, SEIU
1199 was a political powerhouse, a fixture in Albany. SEIU
1199’s record-setting political contributions and members,
who could flood the legislative corridor when needed, gave
them the clout to be the legislators’ best friend or worst
nightmare. [Union leader] Dennis [Rivera] and the industry
leaders used their coordinated efforts in Albany to win billions of dollars of reimbursements for the hospitals, which
translated into stable balance sheets for the employers and
excellent wages and the gold standard of benefits for hospital workers, including multi-million dollar training and upgrading funds for workers. 111

109. STERN, supra note 75, at 70–71; Bai, supra note 77, at 42.
110. See Matt Smith, Union Disunity, SF WEEKLY.COM, April 11, 2007,
http://www.sfweekly.com/2007-04-11/news/union-disunity [hereinafter Smith, Union Disunity] (complaining of a “sweetheart deal” between SEIU and California
nursing home companies).
111. STERN, supra note 75, at 72.
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One controversial example of such a quid pro quo was the
recently-terminated California nursing homes agreement. 112
Under the agreement, SEIU was to help the nursing home
companies achieve more funding and better regulation, and in
return SEIU could organize under a card-check and neutrality
agreement. Thanks to SEIU’s political support, California increased funding for nursing home providers and secured almost
$1 billion in federal matching funds for its reimbursement system. 113
However, critics lambasted several aspects of this deal.
First, SEIU allegedly agreed to lobby for limitations on the litigation rights of patients against the homes. 114 Second, employees who signed up with the union under these agreements
were allegedly restricted in their ability to report problems
with the quality of safety of the care. 115 Third, employees who
signed up were given a provisional contract under a template
agreement that purportedly did not give them much say in
their contract. 116 Although SEIU was able to sign up several
thousand nursing home employees through the agreement, it
recently terminated the deal. 117
It would be wrong to characterize any of the five SEIU factors—concentration, geographic organizing, card-check campaigns, multi-faceted pressure, and “added value” to the employer—as completely novel. The novelty is the combination of
these factors, together with the level of success SEIU has enjoyed in the current era. This multi-pronged approach is also
at play in SEIU’s effort to work with the scions of capitalism in
the private equity campaign.

112. Mark Brenner, SEIU Ends Nursing Home Partnership: California Deal
Left Members out of Organizing and Bargaining, COUNTERPUNCH, June 25, 2007,
http://www.counterpunch.org/brenner06252007.html.
113. Michelle Amber, SEIU Terminates Controversial Agreement With Nursing
Home Chains in California, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), No. 114, at C–1 (June 14,
2007).
114. Matt Smith, Partners in Slime, SF WEEKLY.COM, June 30, 2004,
http://www.sfweekly.com/2004-06-30/news/partners-in-slime/full.
These efforts
were said to have been put on hold after the story. Smith, Union Disunity, supra
note 110.
115. Smith, Union Disunity, supra note 110.
116. Id. (arguing that the agreements “prohibit the workers from having a say
in their job conditions”).
117. Amber, supra note 113. See also Kris Maher, Unions Forge Secret Pacts
with Major Employers, WALL ST. J., May 10, 2008, at A1 (discussing secret
agreements between large companies and SEIU which provide certain benefits for
and restrictions on union organizing at those companies).
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III. SEIU’S PRIVATE EQUITY CAMPAIGN
SEIU’s private equity campaign took place on a turf that is
familiar to the union but unfamiliar to many private equity
players. Although private equity firms have been plying their
trade for many years, the industry had little presence in Washington, D.C. circles. In fact, private equity did not even have a
lobbying group until February 2007. 118 Although the firms had
substantial financial power, their lack of political presence
made them vulnerable when the taxation of private equity became a major issue in the last year.
To understand the issue, a brief discussion of private equity compensation is in order. Private equity managers are
generally paid fees based on a small percentage of the overall
investment they manage as well as a larger percentage of the
profits they generate. 119 These fees are usually a two percent
“value of the fund” fee in addition to twenty percent of the profits that the fund makes. 120 The twenty percent of profits is
taxed at the fifteen percent capital gains rate, as compared
with the thirty–five percent tax rate on income. 121 This percentage of profits, known as “carried interest,” is taxed not at
the income rate, but rather at the significantly lower capital
gains rate. 122
Although this tax structure has long been in existence, it
did not attract attention until last spring. Several private equity firms called attention to the unique tax advantages of such
firms when they made initial public offerings earlier in the
year. Beginning with Fortress Investment Group in February
and continuing through the Blackstone Group, these firms
managed to tap into the public equity markets and retain their
Their complicated
tax-advantaged partnership status. 123
structure—a blend of limited partnerships and LLCs—belied
any purpose other than managing this beneficial tax status.
One senator complained that the deals treated taxes not as the
118. Private Equity Council, About the Private Equity Council,
http://www.privateequitycouncil.org/about/.
119. This pay structure is referred to as “two and twenty”: the managers get
two percent of the overall investment as well as twenty percent of the future profits of the fund. See Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits
in Private Equity Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 8 (2008).
120. See id.
121. See id. at 14.
122. Id.
123. Fleischer, Taxing Blackstone, supra note 13, at 9–10.
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fair share owed to society, but rather as “an obstacle course to
be gamed and gotten around.” 124 The prominent tax gamesmanship of these IPOs, particularly the Blackstone IPO, called
attention to the underlying benefits that all private equity
firms enjoy. 125 Thanks in part to a scholarly paper, 126 Congress has taken up the taxing disparity in earnest. Over the
summer of 2007 Congressional committees held several hearings on the issue, and several bills were introduced to change
the tax treatment of private equity firms. 127
Given the nature of the debate, one might expect unions to
be in the thick of it over private equity’s favorable tax treatment. And indeed, labor has been supportive of efforts to raise
taxes on these firms. The AFL-CIO supports legislation that
would raise the taxation rates on private equity carried interest and would close the loophole allowing Blackstone and other
publicly-traded partnerships to avoid corporate taxation. 128
SEIU is notable, however, because it pursued a much more intensive approach.
The centerpiece of SEIU’s private-equity engagement is a
forty-two page policy paper entitled “Behind the Buyouts.” 129

124. Alan Zibel, Blackstone’s Tax Strategy Comes Under Scrutiny in Washington, AP WIRE, July 13, 2007 (quoting Senator Baucus).
125. John E. Morris, First-Mover Disadvantage, THE DEAL, June 25–July 8,
2007, at 24 (noting that the publicity from the Blackstone IPO “may have blown
up on it”).
126. See Fleischer, Two and Twenty, supra note 119. For a discussion of the
influence of Fleischer’s paper on the private equity taxation debate, see John Carney, Private Equity Taxes: The Capitol Hill Tax Clash Heats Up, DEALBREAKER,
Sept. 6, 2007, http://www.dealbreaker.com/2007/09/private_equity_taxes_the_
capit.php (calling Fleischer “the intellectual godfather of the private equity tax
hikes”); Lerer, supra note 14 (quoting a tax policy expert as saying that Fleischer’s
paper “really did ignite this debate over private equity taxation”); Andrew Ross
Sorkin, A Professor’s Word on the Buyout Battle, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Andrew
Ross Sorkin ed.), Oct. 3, 2007, http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/10/03/aprofessors-word-on-the-buyout-battle (discussing the “whirlwind” the paper has
caused).
127. The bills range in their coverage. Some bills would only cover publiclytraded partnerships such as Blackstone. See S. 1624, 110th Cong. (1st Sess.
2007), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=
110_cong_bills&docid=f:s1624is.txt.pdf (also known as the “Blackstone Bill”).
Other bills would cover private investment management partnerships, such as
private equity firms, and real estate partnerships. See H.R. 2834, 110th Cong.
(1st Sess. 2007), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?db
name=110_cong_bills&docid=f:h2834ih.txt.pdf.
128. See AFL-CIO Executive Council Statement, Private Equity and Hedge
Funds, August 8, 2007, http://www.aflcio.org/aboutus/thisistheaflcio/ecouncil/ec
08082007b.cfm (supporting H.R. 2834 and S. 1624).
129. Service Employees International Union, Behind the Buyouts, April 2007,
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The purpose of the report, according to its introduction, is to
provide “a snapshot for everyday investors, workers, community members, and the public about the private equity buyout
industry and its practices.” 130 The report focuses on the top
five private equity firms and describes their principals (the
“moneymakers”), their investors (“money sources”), and their
deals (“printing money”). 131 It also provides brief narratives of
five private equity deals: four that can be characterized as
“bad” deals and one that is a “good” deal. 132 The four bad deals
involve poor decision-making, crushing debt burdens, laid-off
workers, and failed companies, yet the buyout firms still pay
themselves oversized (and premature) returns. 133 The fifth example shares many similarities: a buyout firm purchases a set
of ailing manufacturing plants, lays off workers, and engages
in hard bargaining with the primarily union workforce. However, this story has a substantially happier ending, as the company provided workers with shares in the company in exchange
for concessions. As a result, when the company’s fortunes
boomed and the private equity firm cashed in, the workers
were able to share in profits. 134
As part of its program of reforms, “Behind the Buyouts”
suggests that private equity firms “should play by the same set
of rules as everyone else.” 135 The report has a sophisticated
explication of the tax treatment that private equity receives. 136
It discusses the tax advantages of debt over equity, the taxing
of carried interest as capital gains rather than income, and the
uniquely favorable tax treatment of private equity firms that
have gone public. 137 In its final recommendations, the report
says that private equity should “invest in the health, security,
and long-term prosperity of America by supporting equitable
tax rates and the elimination of loopholes that increase the tax
burden on working Americans.” 138

http://www.behindthebuyouts.org/storage/documents/5433300H_whitepaper_revise8-20.pdf [hereinafter Behind the Buyouts].
130. Id. at 11.
131. Id. at 22–27.
132. Id. at 28–32.
133. Id. at 28–31.
134. Id. at 31–32.
135. Id. at 35.
136. Id. at 15–16.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 35.
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The “Behind the Buyouts” report provides a centerpiece to
SEIU’s ongoing campaign on private equity, which includes political activity, street demonstrations, and a blog. 139 Other tactics have been used as well. For instance, in a creative bit of
street theater, SEIU performers staged a mock protest in the
Hamptons. 140 The performers, caricatures of wealthy snobs,
complained about the possibility of higher taxation on private
equity with slogans such as “protect the emerging plutocracy.” 141 As the director of SEIU’s private equity project
stated, “[t]he idea that people who have so much money need to
have a more privileged tax status than other people is so absurd.” 142
On the surface, much of the SEIU private equity campaign
follows the traditional path of labor against capital. The “Behind the Buyouts” report is designed to convey a sense of fear
and concern about the powerful and secretive buyout firms who
can wreak havoc on productive industries. And yet the picture
is not so clear-cut. Despite this rhetoric, throughout 2007
SEIU did not take an official position on the taxation bills in
the Senate. 143 This did not appear to be due to a concern that
the legislation fails to go far enough. Instead, staying on the
sidelines appeared to be a conscious strategy, designed to extract as much leverage as possible from the politics of the
situation.
The ongoing “Behind the Buyouts” campaign is part of a
complicated effort to engage with private equity on many levels. Certain elements of the campaign are consistent with traditional unionism: creative attacks on wealth and privilege, efforts to make the tax system more progressive, and publicity
campaigns designed to put pressure on private equity as employers of union members. However, there also appears to be
another subtext: namely, an effort to engage with private equity on a nationwide level in order to expand the union’s mem-

139. SEIU also has had specific blogs for certain firms, such as a blog about
Blackstone prior to the IPO. Julie Creswell, A Union Takes Cautious Aim at
Blackstone’s Public Offering Plan, N.Y. TIMES, March 30, 2007, at C6. At first,
the blog did not identify itself as SEIU-related. Id.
140. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Buyout Tax Debate Hits the Hamptons, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (Andrew Ross Sorkin ed.), Aug. 30, 2007, http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes
.com/2007/08/30/buyout-tax-debate-hits-the-hamptons.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. There was no indication, in the report or on the website, that SEIU has
officially endorsed the two proposed bills that would raise private equity tax rates.
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bership across a new set of companies. In this sense, the private equity campaign is at various times either a carrot or a
stick designed to make SEIU an attractive working partner
with private equity firms.
SEIU’s relationship with private equity extends beyond the
traditional Washington interest-group lobbying. As the “Behind the Buyouts” report acknowledges, SEIU and its members
have a direct financial relationship with private equity. 144
SEIU members invest in pension funds, and these funds generally invest between five and ten percent of their holdings with
private equity firms. 145 Thus, union pension funds are partially responsible for the high fees collected by private equity
managers, since they are willing to pay them. SEIU is no exception.
Moreover, the tone of the “Buyouts” report is more equivocal than one might expect, particularly on a close reading. As
the report makes clear, it is not against private equity when
private equity works to include employees in its wealth generation. As the report states in its conclusion:
[T]he incredible wealth that exists in the private equity
buyout industry presents a historic opportunity to help create real opportunities for the millions of working people who
are being shut out of the American Dream. There is more
than enough wealth in the buyout business for the buyout
firms to continue to prosper while also adapting their existing business model to expand opportunities to benefit workers, communities, and the nation. 146

The report seems to be saying that private equity is not inevitably anti-worker; rather, private equity has simply failed to
follow a more equitable model up to this point.
What, exactly, would be a more equitable model? The report contends that private equity firms should give workers
and communities a voice in the buyout process and a stake in
the returns they generate. 147 In particular, workers should
have a seat at the table during deals, as well as good paychecks
and benefits. In addition, workers should have the ability to
choose a union through “majority sign-up without interference

144.
145.
146.
147.

Behind the Buyouts, supra note 129, at 11.
Id.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 35.
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from any party”—in other words, a neutrality and card-check
certification agreement. 148
SEIU has specific reasons for wanting such accommodations from private equity. The Carlyle Group—one of the five
biggest private equity firms in the United States—recently
purchased Manor Care nursing homes. 149 The Toledo-based
Manor Care Inc. has about 500 nursing and assisted living care
centers staffed by 60,000 employees. 150 SEIU is trying to organize these employees, and its multi-pronged approach is in
evidence. The union is seeking a neutrality and card-check
agreement from Manor Care, and it is applying tremendous political and public pressure on Carlyle in support of its negotiations. Since the purchase, SEIU has staged public demonstrations raising concerns that Carlyle will seek to cut costs and
reduce care in order to make a quick profit. 151 These concerns
were reinforced by a New York Times article discussing the
problems of for-profit nursing home care. 152 Two Congressional committees will begin investigations into business practices at nursing homes owned by private investment groups. 153
Moreover, Senators Baucus and Grassley, who lead the Senate
Finance Committee, sent letters to Carlyle and four other private-equity firms asking for information related to their ownership and management of nursing homes. 154 Baucus and
148. Id.
149. See Manor Care Shareholders Approve Buyout, BOSTON.COM, Oct. 18,
2007, http://www.boston.com/business/healthcare/articles/2007/10/18/manor_care
_shareholders_approve_buyout/.
150. Id.
151. Thomas Heath, Union Protests Carlyle’s Bid for Manor Care, WASH. POST,
Sept. 20, 2007, at D4, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/09/19/AR2007091902055.html. SEIU has created a
website on this issue. See Carlyle Fix Manor Care Now, http://carlylefixmanor
carenow.org (last visited May 22, 2008); see also Dan Primack, Human
Rights & Private Equity, PRIVATE EQUITY WEEK WIRE, Dec. 11, 2007,
http://www.pewnews.com/story.asp?sectioncode=44&storycode=43512 (discussing
SEIU’s criticism of Carlyle Group for selling a percentage on the firm to an Abu
Dhabi sovereign wealth fund); Andrew Ross Sorkin, Union Protest Roils Private
Equity Conference, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Andrew Ross Sorkin ed.), Jan. 18,
2008,
http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/01/18/union-protest-roils-privateequity-conference (discussing SEIU’s protest of a speech by Carlyle managing director David Rubenstein at an academic private equity conference).
152. Charles Duhigg, At Many Homes, More Profit and Less Nursing, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 23, 2007, at 1.1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/23/
business/23nursing.html.
153. Charles Duhigg, Nursing Homes Owned by Private Equity Face
U.S.
Inquiries,
INT’L
HERALD
TRIB.,
Oct.
24,
2007,
http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/10/24/business/nursing.php.
154. Thomas Heath, Under Pressure, Carlyle Issues Patient Promise, WASH.
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Grassley are the same Senators who have proposed the “publicly-traded partnership” taxation bill. 155 All of this scrutiny
prompted Carlyle to take the unusual step of issuing a statement promising to provide adequate staffing and resources to
Manor Care patients. 156
SEIU was also behind another piece of legislation that
would have put pressure on Carlyle. The California state legislature considered a bill that would bar its state pension funds
from investing in any private equity fund which is partially
owned by countries with human rights concerns. 157 Carlyle is
one such firm, having sold a 7.5% stake to the sovereign wealth
fund of Abu Dhabi. 158 Although the bill ostensibly was concerned about the influence of foreign governments, many commentators saw it as an effort by SEIU to put pressure on Carlyle. 159 Critics pointed out that the bill targeted investments
from Abu Dhabi but not China. The Wall Street Journal
claimed that: “China got a pass because its sovereign wealth
fund invests with the Blackstone Group private equity firm,
and the SEIU has negotiated janitorial agreements with Blackstone real-estate companies.” 160 State-employee funds such as

POST., Oct. 22, 2007, at D1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/10/21/AR2007102101034.html.
155. See S. 1624, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007), available at http://frwebgate.acc
ess.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_bills&docid=f:s1624is.txt.pdf;
H.R. 2834, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.
gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_bills&docid=f:h2834ih.txt.pdf.
156. Heath, supra note 154.
157. The countries invested in the private equity funds through their sovereign
wealth funds. The Responsible Private Equity Investment Act of 2008, California
A.B. 1967, available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/07-08/bill/asm/ab_19512000/ab_1967_bill_20080214_introduced.html (describing countries’ investments
as part of the legislative counsel’s digest of a proposed California bill). The countries targeted were those that had not signed on to certain human rights treaties.
158. The Associated Press, Abu Dhabi Lays Out Investment Principles for its
Government-Run Wealth Funds, INT’L HERALD TRIB., March 18, 2008,
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/03/18/business/NA-FIN-US-Abu-DhabiSovereign-Wealth.php.
159. Editorial, CalPERS Board Must Keep Its Priorities Straight,
BEE,
March
17,
2008,
at
B4,
available
at
SACRAMENTO
http://www.sacbee.com/110/story/790480.html (noting that “[t]he Service
Employees International Union is the driving force behind Torrico’s bill” and that
“SEIU’s real target appears to be the Carlyle Group”). But see Stephen Lerner,
Letter to the Editor, SEIU Seeks Ethics, Good Returns, WALL ST. J., April 26,
2008, at A8 (“The Service Employees International Union supported California’s
Responsible Private Equity Investment Act because it was in the best interest of
global human rights and long-term responsible investing.”).
160. Editorial, California’s Stern Rebuke, WALL ST. J., April 21, 2008, at A16
[hereinafter WSJ California Editorial]. But see Behind the Buyouts, SEIU Re-
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the California Public Employees’ Retirement System
(CalPERS) and the California State Teachers’ Retirement System (CalSTRS) were believed to oppose the bill, fearing that it
will hurt their ability to invest effectively. 161 Although the bill
was initially given a fair chance of passage, 162 it was ultimately
tabled. 163
This campaign directed at Carlyle has the hallmark elements of a comprehensive SEIU organizing drive. It focuses on
a concentrated set of employees. It seeks to get a neutrality
and card-check certification agreement that will expedite the
organizing drive for these employees. It is using pressure from
a variety of sources: public and client concern, media coverage,
Congressional investigations, related legislation, and worker
protests. But where is the added value? SEIU’s public campaign against Carlyle has shown the “stick” side of its negotiating strategy. The carrots may not exist, or they may only be
discussed behind closed doors. But it is possible to see the potential for “added value” in several places. SEIU has demonstrated its willingness and ability to secure government resources in support of its affiliated industries. In fact, SEIU
made its pact with California nursing homes that led to increased governmental funding to these industries, benefiting
both management and workers. And there may even be a
higher level of negotiations going on here. SEIU not only has
its political power to throw behind increased health care funding; it can also support higher “carried interest” taxation as
well. SEIU’s decision to hold off on endorsing a bill may have
been an implicit offer to private equity: work with us, and we
will back off from supporting higher taxes. Even though SEIU
has come out with more explicit support for reform, that support can always been tamped down, or quietly withdrawn.
SEIU has been masterful at marshalling a variety of pressures on its negotiating opposites. The private equity camsponds to the Wall Street Journal, http://www.behindthebuyouts.org/seiuresponds-to-wsj (last visited May 21, 2008) (stating that “AB 1967 looked to
whether countries had signed certain ‘core’ human rights treaties (as identified by
the United Nations),” and that “China has signed onto the treaties in question”).
161. The CalSTRS board voted to oppose the legislation. The CalPERS board
did not hold a vote, but its chief investment officer told state lawmakers that the
bill would have a negative impact on the fund. WSJ California Editorial, supra
note 160.
162. Matthew
Wurtzel,
Could
CalPERS,
CalSTRS
Exit
Private
Equity?, DEALSCAPE, April 1, 2008, http://www.thedeal.com/dealscape/2008/04/
could_calpers_calstrs_exit_pri.php.
163. WSJ California Editorial, supra note 160.
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paign might be just another pressure that can be applied or
laid off as part of the grand scheme of union growth. Rather
than being a separate political project, it may be part of an
overall plan to work with private equity as partners instead of
supplicants. Such negotiations are secret, if they have happened or are happening at all. But they would explain much
about the exact nature of SEIU’s private equity campaign.
IV. LABOR AND THE BUSINESS OF POLITICS
“Interest-group politics” is a term with unfavorable connotations. The many economic interest groups that lobby Congress for favorable treatment, along with the money they
shovel into the process, are often derided as the root of our political failures. Measures such as the McCain-Feingold campaign finance legislation have endeavored to remove some of
the effects of money on the process. 164 Although the Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of most of the Act, 165 critics
contend it has only forced special interest lobbying into new
channels. 166 Many believe that any true reform is impossible.
Labor unions are restricted in their ability to participate in
the political process. In 1947, the Labor-Management Relations Act prohibited unions from contributing to federal election campaigns. 167 The provision was construed narrowly by
the Supreme Court, allowing unions to donate to campaigns as
long as the monies were paid out of voluntary, separatelyadministered political funds. 168 The prohibition has been
fleshed out in subsequent legislation. 169 Most recently, the
164. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat.
81) (codified as part of FECA, in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C. and 36 U.S.C.).
165. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm., 540 U.S. 93, 114 (2003).
166. Miriam Galston, Emerging Constitutional Paradigms and Justifications
for Campaign Finance Regulation: The Case of 527 Groups, 95 GEO. L.J. 1181,
1182–84 (2007) (discussing the criticisms of so-called “527 Groups” for their “creative ways to evade campaign finance laws, through legal ‘loopholes’ or arguably
illegal ones”).
167. Labor-Management Relations Act, ch. 120, § 304, 61 Stat. 136, 159-60
(1947).
168. See Pipefitters Local 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385 (1972); United
States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1948).
169. Section 304 was repealed by § 201(a) of the Federal Election Campaign
Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475, 496 (1976), and replaced by
Section 112(2) of the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments, Pub. L. No.
94-283, 90 Stat. 475, 486-490 (1976) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441b
(1982)). Section 441b prohibits the use of agency fees by unions in connection with
federal elections. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1982). This provision was further modified
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McCain-Feingold Act extended the restrictions on political advocacy to include all “electioneering communications.” 170 The
Supreme Court upheld this extension. 171
Under these campaign finance provisions, unions must
generally play by the same rules as corporations. However,
they face a separate hurdle to their political spending. In a series of cases interpreting both the Railway Labor Act (RLA)
and the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), the Supreme
Court has determined that unions do not have the right to require objecting nonmembers to pay for costs outside those incurred in collective bargaining. 172 Outside of states with “right
to work” provisions, unions may require both members and
nonmembers to pay for the union’s costs of representing the
bargaining unit. 173 However, there are limitations on the types
of expenses that can be charged to nonmembers. According to
the Court, objectors must only pay their portion of those expenses that were “necessarily or reasonably incurred for the
purpose of performing the duties of an exclusive representative
of the employees in dealing with the employer on labormanagement issues.” 174 Political spending is the quintessential type of expenditure than cannot be charged to objectors. 175
Although the basic principle of separation has been established, there is still controversy over the mechanisms unions
must follow in implementing this principle. The NLRB and the
courts have wrestled with questions such as the notice that unions need to provide about their expenditures, 176 the information unions must provide to objectors about expenditures, 177
by McCain-Feingold. See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-155, Title II, §§ 203, 204, 214(d), 116 Stat. 91, 92, 95.
170. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2) (Supp. II 2007).
171. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 204 (2003).
172. See Commc’n Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988); Ellis v. Bhd. of
Ry., Airline & Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express & Station, 466 U.S.
435 (1984); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
173. NLRB v. Gen. Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 744–45 (1963) (permitting
“agency shop” agreements whereby unions charge non-members for the costs of
collective representation).
174. Ellis, 466 U.S. at 448.
175. Machinists, 367 U.S. at 766–69; Beck, 487 U.S. at 740 (finding that objectors need not participate in “the union’s expenditure of their fees on activities
such as . . . lobbying for labor legislation, and participating in social, charitable,
and political events”).
176. See, e.g., California Saw & Knife Works, 320 N.L.R.B. 224 (1995) enforced
sub nom. International Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. NLRB, 133
F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 1998).
177. Id. at 239–41; see also Ferriso v. NLRB, 125 F.3d 865 (D.C. Cir. 1997);
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and the process unions must provide for objectors to contest the
nature of different types of spending. 178 Most recently, the Supreme Court upheld the right of states to require that publicsector unions receive affirmative authorization from a nonmember before spending that nonmember’s agency-shop fees
for election-related purposes. 179
This line of jurisprudence requiring a separation between
collective-bargaining expenses and “unrelated” expenses has
been oft criticized in the law review literature. 180 Much of the
commentary has focused on statutory interpretation and Congressional intent, arguing that Congress did not mean to curtail the union’s political activity. 181 However, the SEIU private
equity campaign demonstrates the inherent flaw in the foundational premise that political spending is not collectivebargaining spending.
Political activity forms an integral part of almost all
SEIU’s organizing campaigns. The support of local politicians
puts additional pressure on employers. 182 Good relations with
these politicians help ensure their presence on the picket lines
when needed. Perhaps more importantly than such face time,
however, is the behind-the-scenes support that politicians can
provide. Some support is in the form of governmental spending; state and local authorities may place certain unionoriented requirements on employers if they want to do government projects. 183 However, state and federal regulation also
Television & Radio Artists (KGW Radio), 327 N.L.R.B. 474, 477 (1999).
178. Air Line Pilots Ass’n v. Miller, 523 U.S. 866 (1998); California Saw, 320
N.L.R.B. at 242.
179. Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n, 127 S. Ct. 2372 (2007).
180. For a sampling of commentary, see Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Union Security Agreements under the National Labor Relations Act: The Statute, the Constitution, and the Court’s Opinion in Beck, 27 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 51 (1990);
George Feldman, Unions, Solidarity, and Class: The Limits of Liberal Labor Law,
15 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 187, 230–41 (1994); Martin H. Malin, The Supreme Court and the Duty of Fair Representation, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 127
(1992); Charles R. Virginia, Comment, Communications Workers v. Beck: Supreme Court Throws Unions Out on Street, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 665 (1989).
181. See, e.g., Commc’n Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 768 (1988)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court’s holding “simply cannot be derived from the plain language of the statute”); Dau-Schmidt, supra note 180.
182. See Erickson et al., supra note 98, at 48 (discussing support from California state and local representatives in the 2000 L.A. Justice for Janitors strike);
Casebeer, supra note 105, at 17 (discussing support of local Miami politicians, as
well as presidential candidate John Edwards).
183. For example, New York and California have enacted legislation prohibiting the use of state funds or property to assist, promote, or deter union organizing. N.Y. LABOR LAW § 211-a (McKinney 2003)); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 16645 (West
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shapes the process of the organizing drive itself. In 1999
changes in California state law made it harder to obtain injunctions against street demonstrations and other public gatherings. SEIU was thus much freer to conduct these demonstrations in its 2000 Justice for Janitors campaign. 184 On the
federal level, the Employee Free Choice Act would require employers to accept the card-check certification that SEIU now
works so hard to implement through employer consent. 185
Moreover, SEIU’s political power is often the “added value”
that the union can bring to the table in negotiations. As discussed earlier, SEIU has worked with potential employers to
develop ways of helping all of the company’s stakeholders. 186
For example, SEIU has pushed for greater state funding and
reimbursement for health care providers whose employees are
SEIU members. In the private equity context, SEIU has
heightened its leverage with the Carlyle Group by pushing for
greater oversight of the company’s level of patient care. On a
broader level, the union may also be dangling its support (or
opposition) to private equity tax hikes as part of the overall
deal. 187
None of this makes SEIU different than any other organization that is seeking to serve its membership. In particular,
SEIU is acting like all savvy businesses do by protecting its interests in the political arena. Such interest-group politics may
seem crass. But as one commentator has argued, “corporate
demand for political activity is a natural response to the effect

2000)). However, the Supreme Court recently found the California provision to be
preempted by the NLRA. Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Brown, 128 S. Ct. 2408
(June 19, 2008).
184. Erickson et al., supra note 98, at 38–42.
185. See Employee Free Choice Act of 2007, H.R. 800, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007).
186. See Part II supra.
187. Congress has yet to act on these bills, heightening the possibility that
they are being used as political capital. In October 2007, Senate Majority Leader
Harry Reid told private equity groups that the proposed tax hikes on private equity would not be enacted that year. Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Buyout Firms to Avoid
Tax Hike; Reid Passes Word Senate Won’t Act, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 2007, at A1.
As Stephen Bainbridge has pointed out, such bills are useful bargaining chips
only when they have not yet been passed. Posting of Stephen Bainbridge to Punditry, On the Democrats Not Taxing Hedge Fund Millionaires,
http://www.stephenbainbridge.com/index.php/punditry/on_the_democrats_not_tax
ing_hedge_fund_millionaires (Nov. 5, 2007) (“Where the interest group is fixed on
avoiding a change in the status quo, however, the balance of power shifts to the
politicos who can use threats to the status quo as a way of extracting funds from
the threatened group on an ongoing basis.”).
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of legal rules on business operations.” 188 Corporations engage
in extensive lobbying all the time in order to further their corporate objectives through the political system. 189 Given the
pervasive and fluctuating schemes of government regulation, it
would be foolhardy for companies not to be engaged in the political process. 190
The notion of businesses seeking to protect and enhance
their regulatory environment is even more compelling in the
union context. The product that unions are “selling”—namely
collective representation services—is a creature of federal
law. 191 It is law that determines the conditions under which
union can look for new members and serve their current ones.
State and local law plays a role by regulating public strikes and
demonstrations as well as access to the employer’s private
property. In these arenas, unions must compete against management groups to tilt the playing fields in their favor. However, unions can also work with companies and management to
improve the regulatory climate for that industry. A union’s political activity is generally not an extracurricular activity unrelated to collective bargaining. As the SEIU experience shows,
politics is always in the service of the core business. SEIU has
amassed significant political power, through its financial resources and the voting power of its members. 192 It uses this
power to secure better terms for its members and offer its services to an ever-expanding pool of health and buildingmaintenance workers. In other words, it uses politics to better

188. Jill E. Fisch, How Do Corporations Play Politics?: The FedEx Story, 58
VAND. L. REV. 1495, 1500 (2005).
189. Id. at 1502; McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 147–48 n.46
(2003) (“Labor and business leaders believe—based on experience and with good
reason—that such access gives them an opportunity to shape and affect governmental decisions and that their ability to do so derives from the fact that they
have given large sums of money to the parties.” (quoting McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 498 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (statement of a former airline executive))).
190. Fisch, supra note 188, at 1570 (“Regulation has become an important factor for U.S. businesses. As a result, corporate political activity must be integrated
within a corporation’s overall business strategy, and corporations need to develop
and manage their political capital in the same way that they manage other business assets.”).
191. See Matthew T. Bodie, Information and the Market for Union Representation, 94 VA. L. REV. 1, 35–45 (2008) (discussing unions as a producers of a service).
192. See Steven Greenhouse, A Union with Clout Stakes Its Claim
on Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2007, at A20, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/30/us/politics/30unions.htm.
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its product and grow its market share—just like any other
business. 193
This recognition is something of a double-edged sword. On
the one hand, it exposes the illogic of any attempt to separate
political funding from the expenses devoted to the “core” business. On the other hand, it shows how SEIU and other unions
are not altruistic charitable organizations, thinking only of the
common good. 194 Rather, they are businesses that provide services. As such, their lobbying can be lumped in with the lobbying that goes on from every other business in every other industry. Perhaps the services provided are more beneficial to
human progress than, say, cigarettes. 195 But it would be a mistake to assume that unions lobby solely for the good of workers.
They are organizations that provide services to workers, and
there are potential conflicts of interests between the providers
and customers. 196
Political influence is critical to the survival of unions. Currently, the procedures and standards surrounding the exclusion of political expenses from objectors’ dues are sufficiently
muddled that there is only a minor effect on union political
power or spending. 197 However, even small regulatory changes
193. Businesses have also recognized the connection between politics and the
business of unions. See Ann Zimmerman & Kris Maher, Wal-Mart Warns of Democratic Win, WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 2008, at A1 (“Wal-Mart Stores Inc. is mobilizing its store managers and department supervisors around the country to warn
that if Democrats win power in November, they’ll likely change federal law to
make it easier for workers to unionize companies—including Wal-Mart.”).
194. Unions often benefit from the notion that they are non-profit advocacy
groups who focus only on the public interest. For example, see this exchange between a reporter and SEIU president Andy Stern:
Q: Why does the SEIU criticize private-equity firms for lobbying when the
SEIU itself spent $1,845,000 in federal lobbying in 2007?
A: SEIU members’ money -- and we are talking about voluntary contributions of about $3 a paycheck -- goes to lobby Congress to reform our
health-care system, to fix broken immigration laws, to provide health
care for children through SCHIP. These issues will improve the lives of
millions of people in this country. Carlyle lobbies to protect indefensible
tax loopholes that benefit a handful of billionaires. Big difference.
Thomas Heath, Taking on the Buyout Industry, WASH. POST, March 10, 2008, at
D3, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/
09/AR2008030901559.html.
195. See, e.g., THANK YOU FOR SMOKING (Room 9 Entertainment 2005).
196. For more discussion of unions as service providers, see Bodie, supra note
191; Samuel Estreicher, Deregulating Union Democracy, 2000 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 501 (2000); Kye D. Pawlenko, Reevaluating Inter-Union Competition: A Proposal to Resurrect Rival Unionism, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 651 (2006).
197. See, e.g., Jeff Canfield, Comment, What a Sham(e): The Broken Beck
Rights System in the Real World Workplace, 47 WAYNE L. REV. 1049 (2001) (dis-
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based on these principles could hamper labor’s political effectiveness down the road. It is time for the NLRB and the courts
to recognize that unions, like businesses, must operate in the
political arena in order to cultivate a favorable regulatory environment.
CONCLUSION
The recent credit shock may put a damper on the growth
that private equity has experienced over the past few years. 198
Traditionally, that would have been good news for unions and
their members. But a new approach to organizing and bargaining, spearheaded by SEIU, may change that equation. Private
equity funds are tough negotiating partners, because of their
economic savvy and their focus on the bottom line. But fund
managers may also prove to have more concern about future
(at least, five to ten years in the future), as well as a greater
willingness to negotiate and a more sensitive response to political and economic pressure. Creative unions will craft their
campaigns to address these strengths and weaknesses.
It would be a shame, however, if the law prevented the
market from working. Current regulations create difficulties
for unions in exercising their political power, and further “paycheck protection” reforms could make the situation significantly worse. We need to recognize that unions, like their negotiating counterparts, are in business. As such, they should
be free to pursue their political objectives as any other business. In the meantime, labor’s political foes will fight to restrict and constrict union political activity. It would be an
ironic end to the story if unions no longer participate in politics
because they lacked the political power to protect their rights
in the first place.

cussing the difficulty of enforcing Beck rights).
198. For a taste of the gloomy rhetoric, see Andrew Ross Sorkin, The Ranks of
the Comfortable Are Still Thinning, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2007, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/09/business/09deal.html (“[A]ll of Wall Street
understands that the private-equity gravy train has jumped the tracks.”). See
also Michael J. de la Merced, Buyout Industry Staggers under Weight of Debt,
N.Y. TIMES, March 11, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/11/
business/11equity.html (contending that private equity’s fortunes were “plummeting”).

